Coordination and weak announcement proofness: Two comments on ``Refining cheap-talk equilibria

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2200zbMATH Open0893.90182OpenAlexW2088578909MaRDI QIDQ1363531FDOQ1363531

John R. Conlon

Publication date: 10 August 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2200

Recommendations

• Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games
• Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games
• Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case
• Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information
• Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games
• Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
• Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
• Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
• A note on strongly renegotiation-proof equilibria

zbMATH Keywords

sender receiver gamesweak announcement proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

This page was built for publication: Coordination and weak announcement proofness: Two comments on ``Refining cheap-talk equilibria

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1363531)