Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages
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Publication:485795
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.06.005zbMATH Open1302.91035OpenAlexW2135819739MaRDI QIDQ485795FDOQ485795
Authors: Shintaro Miura 
Publication date: 14 January 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.06.005
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Cites Work
- Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
- A model of expertise
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Eliciting information from a committee
- On the Limits of Communication in Multidimensional Cheap Talk: A Comment
- Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
Cited In (14)
- Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Signaling games in multiple dimensions: geometric properties of equilibrium solutions
- Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
- On the Limits of Communication in Multidimensional Cheap Talk: A Comment
- Two-sided strategic information transmission
- Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
- An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
- Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication
- Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
- Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
- Cheap talk with private signal structures
- Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games
- Sequential cheap talks
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