Meaningful cheap talk must improve equilibrium payoffs
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Publication:1296513
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00018-3zbMATH Open0937.91012OpenAlexW2118538350WikidataQ126651886 ScholiaQ126651886MaRDI QIDQ1296513FDOQ1296513
Authors: V. Pereyra 
Publication date: 14 June 2000
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(98)00018-3
Recommendations
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
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- Cheap Talk With Endogenous Conflict of Interest
- How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games
- Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk
- Cheap talk comparisons in multi-issue bargaining
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784399
Cites Work
- Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
- Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
- A model of pre-game communication
- Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes
- Communication and superior cooperation in two-player normal form games
Cited In (8)
- Long Cheap Talk
- Cheap Talk With Endogenous Conflict of Interest
- Completely fair SFE and coalition-safe cheap talk
- Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
- Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
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