Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90047-VzbMATH Open0825.90828OpenAlexW2060486649MaRDI QIDQ1194263FDOQ1194263

Authors: Daniel J. Seidmann 

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90047-v

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Cites Work

• Strategic Information Transmission
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Credible debate equilibria
• Communication between rational agents
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans

Cited In (3)

• Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information
• Meaningful cheap talk must improve equilibrium payoffs
• The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games

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