Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90047-VMaRDI QIDQ1194263zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel J. Seidmann

Publication date 27 September 1992

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90047-v

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4006016 (Why is no real title available?)
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Communication between rational agents
• Credible debate equilibria
• Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited in

(3)

• Meaningful cheap talk must improve equilibrium payoffs
• The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games
• Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information

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