Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.001zbMath1311.91049OpenAlexW2105314806MaRDI QIDQ2345214

Shih En Lu, Attila Ambrus

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

communicationcheap talkimperfect informationmulti-senders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (8)

Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest ⋮ Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult ⋮ The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders ⋮ Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages ⋮ Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games ⋮ Designing communication hierarchies ⋮ Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources ⋮ An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk

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