Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example

DOI10.2307/2937792MaRDI QIDQ3471801zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Françoise Forges

Publication date 1990

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2937792

zbMATH Keywords

communication equilibrium payoffsconversation gameinformation transmissionsignaling steps

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Trade models (91B60)

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Cited in

(28)

• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information
• Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games
• Sender-receiver games with cooperation
• Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions.
• The value of mediated communication
• Designing communication hierarchies
• Goodwill in communication
• Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects
• Strategic information exchange
• Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
• Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
• Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
• Smoothed analysis of local search algorithms
• MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES
• A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games
• Repeated games with incomplete information
• Signaling games
• Long information design
• Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
• Splitting games over finite sets
• The economics of excuses: job market cheap talk with pre-employment tests
• Educational signaling in two different education systems
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• The communication cost of selfishness
• Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players
• Long persuasion games
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion

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