scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19676

MaRDI QIDQ3979169zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kevin D. Cotter

Publication date 26 June 1992

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Review text

[For the entire collection see Zbl 0734.00037.] This paper studies communication equilibria in finite-player games with arbitrary type spaces. It provides a generalization of the revelation theorem to a setting in which type spaces and action sets may be infinite. It presents an example that demonstrates that the communication equilibrium correspondence need not be continuous with respect to the information structure.

Recommendations

• Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information
• Extending communication-proof equilibrium to infinite games
• Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games

Cited in

(2)

• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
• Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions

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