Extending communication-proof equilibrium to infinite games

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00445-1MaRDI QIDQ5941399zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors José Luis Ferreira

Publication date 20 August 2001

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00445-1

zbMATH Keywords

communication-proofinfinite gamesstable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information
• A communication-proof equilibrium concept
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Cites work

• A communication-proof equilibrium concept
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Deriving strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria from an abstract system

Cited in

(4)

• Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
• The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games
• Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19676 (Why is no real title available?)

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