Experts, conflicts of interest, and reputation for ability

DOI10.1111/IJET.12037MaRDI QIDQ4584724zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Filippo Pavesi, Massimo Scotti

Publication date 4 September 2018

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10453/30219

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkconflicts of interestexpertsinformation transmissionreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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(9)

• Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
• Information control in reputational cheap talk
• A mathematical model of communication with reputational concerns
• Will truth out? -- An advisor's quest to appear competent
• Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments
• Information projection: model and applications
• Court‐appointed experts and accuracy in adversarial litigation
• Strategic disclosure with reputational concerns
• Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships

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