Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1367MaRDI QIDQ3573062zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Leonardo Conegundes Martinez

Publication date 30 June 2010

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1367

zbMATH Keywords

agencycareer concernsdynamic gamesjob assignmentslearningreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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(9)

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• Type composition, career concerns, and signaling efforts
• Reputation and the ``need for enemies
• Mixed up? That's good for motivation
• Coordination under the shadow of career concerns
• The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies
• Motivational ratings
• Private Information and Intertemporal Job Assignments1
• Repeated matching, career concerns, and firm size

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