Reputation in long-run relationships

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDR037MaRDI QIDQ4610510zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alp E. Atakan, Mehmet Ekmekci

Publication date 23 January 2019

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdr037

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesreputationlong-run playersequal discount factor

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
• Reputation with observed actions
• Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
• Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players
• Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device

Cited in

(18)

• Bounded memory and permanent reputations
• Occurrence of deception under the oversight of a regulator having reputation concerns
• Reputation for Quality
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620856 (Why is no real title available?)
• For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment
• Restricted feedback in long term relationships
• (Bad) reputation in relational contracting
• Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
• Long-term relationships as safeguards
• Order of limits in reputations
• Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
• Information asymmetry and reentry
• Bad Reputation
• A Theory of Credibility
• A reputation for honesty
• Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
• Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments
• Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games

This page was built for publication: Reputation in long-run relationships

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4610510)