Reputation in long-run relationships

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDR037MaRDI QIDQ4610510zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alp E. Atakan, Mehmet Ekmekci

Publication date 23 January 2019

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdr037

zbMATH Keywords

equal discount factorlong-run playersrepeated gamesreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
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Cited in

(18)

• For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment
• Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games
• Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
• Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
• Information asymmetry and reentry
• A reputation for honesty
• Order of limits in reputations
• Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620856 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Credibility
• Bounded memory and permanent reputations
• Bad Reputation
• Occurrence of deception under the oversight of a regulator having reputation concerns
• Reputation for Quality
• (Bad) reputation in relational contracting
• Restricted feedback in long term relationships
• Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
• Long-term relationships as safeguards

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