Private Information and Intertemporal Job Assignments1

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2006.00386.XMaRDI QIDQ5474468zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Edward Simpson Prescott, Robert M. Townsend

Publication date 26 June 2006

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00386.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Dynamic labor contracts with temporary layoffs and permanent separations
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(4)

• Job rotation as a learning mechanism
• Project assignments when budget padding taints resource allocation
• Private Information, Wage Bargaining and Employment Fluctuations
• Designing rotation programs: limits and possibilities

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