Self-Selection and Monitoring in Dynamic Incentive Problems with Incomplete Contracts

DOI10.2307/2297816MaRDI QIDQ4033905zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors A. J. Hosios, Michael Peters

Publication date 16 May 1993

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297816

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economic growth models (91B62)

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(5)

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• Private Information and Intertemporal Job Assignments1
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