The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem

DOI10.2307/2297391MaRDI QIDQ3780708zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James M. Malcomson, Frans Spinnewyn

Publication date 1988

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297391

zbMATH Keywords

incentivesmoral hazardrisk sharingrepeated principal-agent modelslong-term contractsshort-term contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economic growth models (91B62) Hierarchical systems (93A13)

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Cited in

(38)

• Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion
• The political economy of indirect control
• Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats
• Dynamic moral hazard without commitment
• Private Information and Intertemporal Job Assignments1
• The principal-agent problem with adaptive players
• The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
• Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: a laboratory experiment
• Optimal equilibrium contracts in the infinite horizon with no commitment across periods
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Impatience versus incentives
• Conditional Analysis and a Principal-Agent Problem
• Optimal retention in agency problems
• Principal-agent models
• Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
• The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
• Information Asymmetry, Participation, and Long-Term Contracts
• Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts
• Dynamic relational contracts under complete information
• Self-evident events and the value of linking
• Random Horizon Principal-Agent Problems
• Myopic agency
• Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
• Dynamic yardstick mechanisms
• Efficiency and equity in dynamic principal-agent problems
• The principal-agent problem for service rate event-dependency
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7594618 (Why is no real title available?)
• A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
• Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment
• The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
• Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit?
• The principal-agent model in venture investment based on fairness preference
• A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem
• Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection
• Principal-agent problem under the linear contract

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