The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00295MaRDI QIDQ5474972zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Debraj Ray

Publication date 16 June 2006

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00295

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05)

Recommendations

• Constrained efficiency without commitment
• Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting
• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
• Optimal self-enforcement and termination
• Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency

Cited in

(16)

• A theory of political and economic cycles
• Paths of efficient self-enforcing trade agreements
• Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
• Outside opportunities and termination
• Monotone contracts
• Dynamic relational contracts under complete information
• A framework for geoeconomics
• Fiscal policy in debt constrained economies
• Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo
• Repeated delegation
• A theory of progressive lending
• Experimentation and approval mechanisms
• Dynamic information provision: rewarding the past and guiding the future
• Relational contracts: public versus private savings
• A dynamic model of authoritarian social control
• Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard

This page was built for publication: The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5474972)