Outside opportunities and termination

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.001zbMath1318.91135OpenAlexW1967572081MaRDI QIDQ2347777

Youzhi Yang, Cheng Wang

Publication date: 8 June 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.001

zbMATH Keywords

terminationoutside opportunitiesoptimal contractingseverance compensation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites Work

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