Outside opportunities and termination
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2347777
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.001zbMath1318.91135MaRDI QIDQ2347777
Publication date: 8 June 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.001
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Cites Work
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