Optimal self-enforcement and termination

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2018.12.010zbMath1411.91362OpenAlexW2915980818WikidataQ128322411 ScholiaQ128322411MaRDI QIDQ1734582

Youzhi Yang, Cheng Wang

Publication date: 27 March 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2018.12.010

zbMATH Keywords

terminationoutside opportunitiesoptimal contractingself-enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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