Optimal CEO turnover
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2155243
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2022.105475zbMath1497.91160MaRDI QIDQ2155243
Publication date: 15 July 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105475
moral hazard; outside option; limited commitment; optimal contracting; CEO compensation and turnover
Cites Work
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- Optimal self-enforcement and termination
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- Outside opportunities and termination
- A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
- Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
- A Theory of Wage Dynamics
- Stochastic Search Equilibrium
- MARKET‐BASED INCENTIVES