Optimal CEO turnover
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Publication:2155243
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Cites work
- A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
- A Theory of Wage Dynamics
- A duality approach to continuous-time contracting problems with limited commitment
- Market-based incentives
- Optimal self-enforcement and termination
- Outside opportunities and termination
- Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
- Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
- Stochastic search equilibrium
- Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model
- When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
Cited in
(8)- Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems
- Promotion, turnover, and compensation in the executive labor market
- Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover
- When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
- A dynamic model of managerial entrenchment and the positive incentives it creates
- Are CEOs expected utility maximizers?
- A conditional logit model for executive incentives
- Performance pay, CEO dismissal, and the dual role of takeovers
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