Optimal self-enforcement and termination

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2018.12.010MaRDI QIDQ1734582zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Cheng Wang, Youzhi Yang

Publication date 27 March 2019

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2018.12.010

zbMATH Keywords

terminationoptimal contractingself-enforcementoutside opportunities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3908100 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• A Theory of Wage Dynamics
• Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets
• Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment
• Job Matching and the Wage Distribution
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment
• Outside opportunities and termination
• Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts

Cited in

(7)

• The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1966921 (Why is no real title available?)
• The optimal solution to a principal-agent problem with unknown agent ability
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
• Optimal CEO turnover
• Termination as an incentive device

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