Termination as an incentive device

DOI10.3982/te3881MaRDI QIDQ6053658

Yuzhe Zhang, Borys Grochulski

Publication date: 23 October 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

suspensionterminationincentivesdynamic moral hazardslow reflection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
• Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model
• When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
• Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance
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• Stochastic differential equations for sticky Brownian motion
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Sticky Brownian motion as the limit of storage processes
• Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment
• Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets
• Optimal Contracts with Shirking
• Sticky Brownian Motion and Its Numerical Solution
• Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking

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