Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance

DOI10.1006/JETH.1995.1032zbMath0830.90026OpenAlexW1988325415MaRDI QIDQ1897309

Robert E. jun. Lucas, Andrew Atkeson

Publication date: 27 August 1995

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1032

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardequality and efficiency in resource allocationidiosyncratic employment risk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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