Optimal contracting with dynastic altruism: family size and per capita consumption
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Publication:405527
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.04.022zbMath1296.91197OpenAlexW2015357279MaRDI QIDQ405527
Ali Shourideh, Roozbeh Hosseini, Larry E. Jones
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=fnce_papers
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