Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover

DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0823-1MaRDI QIDQ2256986zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jacek Rothert

Publication date 23 February 2015

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0823-1

zbMATH Keywords

learningpolitical instabilityprincipal-agentreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Economic growth models (91B62) History, political science (91F10)

Recommendations

• Optimal CEO turnover
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Cites work

• A theory of political cycles
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3069635 (Why is no real title available?)
• Ideology and endogenous constitutions
• Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns *
• Optimal retention in agency problems
• Political instability and economic growth
• Public trust and government betrayal
• Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence
• Repeated moral hazard with persistence
• Reputation from nested activities
• Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth
• When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts

Cited in

(1)

• Moral hazard and compensation packages: does reshuffling matter?

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