Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover

DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0823-1zbMath1319.91116OpenAlexW2011401072MaRDI QIDQ2256986

Jacek Rothert

Publication date: 23 February 2015

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0823-1

zbMATH Keywords

learningpolitical instabilityprincipal-agentreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Economic growth models (91B62) History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

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• Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence
• Repeated moral hazard with persistence
• Public trust and government betrayal
• A theory of political cycles
• Optimal retention in agency problems
• When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
• Ideology and endogenous constitutions
• Reputation from nested activities
• Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth
• Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns *
• Political instability and economic growth

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