Repeated moral hazard with persistence

DOI10.1007/S00199-004-0488-2MaRDI QIDQ813229zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Toshihiko Mukoyama, Ayşegül Şahin

Publication date 31 January 2006

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/01-2004-cah.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

human capitalunemployment insurance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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• Design, analysis and simulation of an optimal wage contract in firms
• Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach
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• Relational contracts in a persistent environment
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• A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection
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