Stock grants as a commitment device

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2005.04.009MaRDI QIDQ959669zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gian Luca Clementi, Thomas F. Cooley, Cheng Wang

Publication date 12 December 2008

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2005.04.009

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardCEO compensationoptimal contractsstock grants

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

Recommendations

• Stock options and managerial optimal contracts
• Stock-based pay, liquidity, and the role of market making
• The effect of option granting on executive stock purchases
• Executive compensation: a calibration approach
• Stock-based compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives

Cites work

• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model
• Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
• Repeated moral hazard with persistence
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• Stock options and managerial optimal contracts

Cited in

(10)

• Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets
• Employee stock ownership and diversification
• Stock options and managerial optimal contracts
• The effect of option granting on executive stock purchases
• Option Compensation and Industry Competition
• Stock-based pay, liquidity, and the role of market making
• Optimal regulation of noncompete contracts
• Ordinary shares and managers
• Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans
• Cost-efficient performance-vesting equity

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