Design, analysis and simulation of an optimal wage contract in firms
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Publication:3579142
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Cites work
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- Productive low morale
- A dynamic programming model for effect of worker's type on wage arrears
- Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: A dynamic version of the right-to-manage model
- The provision of wage incentives: a structural estimation using contracts variation
- Human capital pricing in corporation based on game theory and system dynamics
- Wage floors, imperfect performance measures, and optimal job design
- An uncertain wage contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard
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