Design, analysis and simulation of an optimal wage contract in firms

DOI10.1108/03684920910994295zbMATH Open1192.91134OpenAlexW1991131861MaRDI QIDQ3579142FDOQ3579142

Wenxia You, Xianjia Wang

Publication date: 5 August 2010

Published in: Kybernetes (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1108/03684920910994295

Recommendations

• An uncertain wage contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard
• An optimal reward contract against the manager's moral hazard with hidden information
• On the design of piece-rate contracts
• Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
• An uncertain wage contract model for risk-averse worker under bilateral moral hazard

zbMATH Keywords

cyberneticscontracts of employmentemployee behaviourmoral hazardspay

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Repeated moral hazard with persistence
• Economic yoyos and Becker's Rotten Kid theorem
• Economic yoyos and never‐perfect value systems
• Economic yoyos, parasites and child labor

Cited In (5)

• An optimal reward contract against the manager's moral hazard with hidden information
• On the design of piece-rate contracts
• Productive low morale
• Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: A dynamic version of the right-to-manage model
• Human capital pricing in corporation based on game theory and system dynamics

This page was built for publication: Design, analysis and simulation of an optimal wage contract in firms

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3579142)