An optimal reward contract against the manager's moral hazard with hidden information

zbMATH Open1164.91379MaRDI QIDQ3537863FDOQ3537863

Authors Yong Zhang

Publication date 24 November 2008

zbMATH Keywords

hidden information moral hazardoptimal reward contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

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(4)

• Design, analysis and simulation of an optimal wage contract in firms
• The virtue of being underestimated: A note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models
• Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information
• The impacts of private risk aversion magnitude and moral hazard in R\&D project under uncertain environment

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