An optimal reward contract against the manager's moral hazard with hidden information

zbMATH Open1164.91379MaRDI QIDQ3537863FDOQ3537863

Authors: Yong Zhang 

Publication date: 24 November 2008

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zbMATH Keywords

hidden information moral hazardoptimal reward contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cited In (3)

• Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information
• Design, analysis and simulation of an optimal wage contract in firms
• The virtue of being underestimated: A note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models

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