Dynamic agency with persistent observable shocks
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Publication:2399679
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.04.003zbMath1394.91262OpenAlexW2610666824MaRDI QIDQ2399679
Publication date: 24 August 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.04.003
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- The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
- A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- An Introduction to Partial Differential Equations
- Optimal Contracts with Shirking
- Convex Analysis
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