Dynamic agency with persistent observable shocks

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2017.04.003zbMATH Open1394.91262OpenAlexW2610666824MaRDI QIDQ2399679FDOQ2399679

Authors: Rui Li 

Publication date: 24 August 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.04.003

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zbMATH Keywords

business cycledynamic contractpersistent shock

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

Cites Work

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• The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
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Cited In (4)

• Big shocks versus small shocks in a dynamic stochastic economy with many interacting agents
• Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks
• The interaction of the productivity shocks with the agency problem and investment of the company
• Efficient allocations in dynamic private information economies with persistent shocks: a first-order approach

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