Dynamic agency with persistent observable shocks

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2017.04.003MaRDI QIDQ2399679zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rui Li

Publication date 24 August 2017

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

business cycledynamic contractpersistent shock

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

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• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
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• Contract theory in continuous-time models
• Convex Analysis
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• Optimal contracts with shirking
• The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility

Cited in

(4)

• Big shocks versus small shocks in a dynamic stochastic economy with many interacting agents
• Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks
• The interaction of the productivity shocks with the agency problem and investment of the company
• Efficient allocations in dynamic private information economies with persistent shocks: a first-order approach

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