A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
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Publication:900607
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.006zbMath1330.91120OpenAlexW1949726554MaRDI QIDQ900607
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.006
Optimal stochastic control (93E20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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