Unemployment insurance with hidden savings

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.03.016MaRDI QIDQ617668zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sumit K. Garg

Publication date 13 January 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23214/1/MPRA_paper_23214.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

hidden savingshidden wealthrepeated moral hazardunemployment insurance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• Cash-on-hand and competing models of intertemporal behavior: new evidence from the labor market
• On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
• Repeated Moral Hazard

Cited in

(18)

• Vouchers as a way to finance unemployment benefits
• A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity
• Efficient unemployment insurance and the cost of borrowing
• Optimal state-contingent unemployment insurance
• The optimal solution to a principal-agent problem with unknown agent ability
• Optimal unemployment insurance and employment history
• Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2076227 (Why is no real title available?)
• Asset-based unemployment insurance
• A Menu of Insurance Contracts for the Unemployed
• Characterization of optimal durations of unemployment benefits in a nonstationary job search model
• Rights to retrade, free-riding and insurance requirement
• On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
• Relational contracts: public versus private savings
• Severance savings accounts and life-cycle savings
• Hidden unemployment
• A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
• An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance

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