Optimal contracts to a principal-agent model with a diffusion coefficient affected by firm size
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Publication:6175374
DOI10.3934/JIMO.2023020zbMath1524.91053MaRDI QIDQ6175374
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Publication date: 21 July 2023
Published in: Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Dynamic programming (90C39) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)
Cites Work
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