Are CEOs expected utility maximizers?

DOI10.1016/J.JECONOM.2009.10.014MaRDI QIDQ737888zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John A. List, C. F. Mason

Publication date 12 August 2016

Published in Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://s3.amazonaws.com/fieldexperiments-papers2/papers/00090.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

decision making under uncertaintyexperimentshigh stakes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)

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Cites work

• Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory Using Experimental Data
• Investigating risky choices over losses using experimental data
• Mixture Symmetry and Quadratic Utility
• Rational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable Utility
• The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk

Cited in

(4)

• Do people maximize quantiles?
• Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?^*
• One-shot decision theory: a fundamental alternative for decision under uncertainty
• Focus programming: a bi‐level programming approach to static stochastic optimization problems

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