Equilibrium CEO contract with belief heterogeneity

DOI10.1007/s00199-022-01440-6zbMath1500.91085OpenAlexW3204696975MaRDI QIDQ2088614

Rose-Anne Dana, Milo Bianchi, Elyès Jouini

Publication date: 6 October 2022

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01440-6

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationheterogeneous beliefsmanager-shareholders equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Related Items (1)

Introduction to the special issue in honor of Larry Epstein

Cites Work

• A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market
• A two-person dynamic equilibrium under ambiguity
• Discounting and divergence of opinion
• The probability approach to general equilibrium with production
• Intertemporal asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs
• Aggregation of opinions in networks of individuals and collectives
• Shareholder heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and the equilibrium manager
• Financial Markets Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Agents*
• Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?^*
• Common Agency
• Capital Structure under Heterogeneous Beliefs*
• Robust Contracts in Continuous Time
• A Theory of the Stakeholder Corporation
• Consensus Consumer and Intertemporal Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Beliefs
• Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets

This page was built for publication: Equilibrium CEO contract with belief heterogeneity