Promotion, turnover, and compensation in the executive labor market

DOI10.3982/ECTA11020MaRDI QIDQ4614320zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors George-Levi Gayle, Limor Golan, Robert A. Miller

Publication date 30 January 2019

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11020

zbMATH Keywords

agency costasymmetric informationcareer concerncompensating differentialexecutive compensationfirm-size pay differentialidentificationmoral hazardsequential equilibriumstructural estimation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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• The Influence of Supervisory Promotion and Network Location on Subordinate Careers in a Dual Ladder RD&E Setting

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