Strategic Promotion and Compensation

DOI10.2307/2297807MaRDI QIDQ4840276zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dan Bernhardt

Publication date 24 July 1995

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297807

zbMATH Keywords

hierarchical firm structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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• Job matching within and across firms
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