Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation

DOI10.2307/2297878MaRDI QIDQ4282693zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tim Worrall, J. P. Thomas

Publication date 14 March 1994

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/268376/files/twerp342.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

Cited in

(16)

• Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment
• Dynamic relational contracts under complete information
• Working to learn
• Outside opportunities and termination
• Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
• Hyperbolic discount curves: a reply to Ainslie
• Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
• A theory of progressive lending
• Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
• A theory of political and economic cycles
• Monotone contracts
• OPTIMAL PAYMENT CONTRACTS IN TRADE RELATIONSHIPS
• Relational contracts: public versus private savings
• Dynamic information provision: rewarding the past and guiding the future
• Dynamic inconsistency and non-preferential taxation of foreign capital
• Differentiability of the value function without interiority assumptions

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