Optimal fixed-terms contracts under one-sided enforcement and persistent adverse selection

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2026.103294MaRDI QIDQ7364443zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors David Martimort, Aggey Semenov

Publication date 2 October 2026

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JMATECO.2026.103294

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

Cites work

• A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
• Nonlinear pricing with budget constraint
• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
• Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection
• Regulating a monopolist with limited funds
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information
• The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements

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