Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.07.012MaRDI QIDQ2667243zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michelle R. Garfinkel, Constantinos Syropoulos

Publication date 24 November 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.012

zbMATH Keywords

destructive warsdisputesoutput insecuritypeaceful settlementunarmed peace

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

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Cites work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects
• Contest success functions
• Inequality and conflict: burning resources to support peace
• Peace agreements without commitment

Cited in

(5)

• Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
• Inequality and conflict: burning resources to support peace
• Peace agreements without commitment
• Peace in an unequal world? Experimental evidence on the relationship between inequality and conflict in a guns-vs-butter setting
• A dynamic theory of war and peace

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