A dynamic theory of war and peace

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.04.005zbMath1244.91058MaRDI QIDQ1958959

Pierre Yared

Publication date: 30 September 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.04.005

zbMATH Keywords

contract theory; asymmetric and private information; war; international political economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B62: Economic growth models

91F99: Other social and behavioral sciences (mathematical treatment)

91B44: Economics of information

Cites Work

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