A dynamic theory of war and peace
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Publication:1958959
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.04.005zbMath1244.91058OpenAlexW3125987214MaRDI QIDQ1958959
Publication date: 30 September 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.04.005
Economic growth models (91B62) Other social and behavioral sciences (mathematical treatment) (91F99) Economics of information (91B44)
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