Constrained efficiency without commitment
From MaRDI portal
Publication:898696
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.09.010zbMATH Open1368.91141OpenAlexW1776703700MaRDI QIDQ898696FDOQ898696
Authors: V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, Yiannis Vailakis
Publication date: 18 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/111453/7/111453.pdf
Recommendations
General equilibrium theory (91B50) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
Cited In (11)
- Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement
- When can we do better than autarky?
- The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements
- Efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage
- Sharing risk efficiently under suboptimal punishments for defection
- Equilibrium efficiency with secured and unsecured assets
- Asset prices, debt constraints and inefficiency
- On Ramsey's conjecture: efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information
- Introduction to financial frictions and debt constraints
- Unique Markov equilibrium under limited commitment
- Non-commitment and savings in dynamic risk-sharing contracts
This page was built for publication: Constrained efficiency without commitment
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q898696)