Non-commitment and savings in dynamic risk-sharing contracts

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0624-7MaRDI QIDQ2494019zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Karine Gobert, Michel Poitevin

Publication date 16 June 2006

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/1866/456

zbMATH Keywords

Dynamic contractsNon-commitmentRisk sharingSavings.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment
• Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment
• Constrained efficiency without commitment
• Efficient risk sharing with limited commitment and storage
• Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard

Cited in

(12)

• Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment
• Taxation without commitment
• Does risk sharing increase with risk aversion and risk when commitment is limited?
• Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment
• When can we do better than autarky?
• Characterization of a risk sharing contract with one-sided commitment
• Savings and default
• The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance
• Efficient risk sharing with limited commitment and storage
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• Efficient risk sharing and separation
• Constrained efficiency without commitment

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