Efficient risk sharing with limited commitment and storage

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDX061MaRDI QIDQ4610919zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Árpád Ábrahám, Sarolta Laczó

Publication date 23 January 2019

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/files/220365293/AbrahamLaczoStorage.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic contractshidden storagelimited commitmentrisk sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15)

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(10)

• Dynamic relational contracts under complete information
• Does risk sharing increase with risk aversion and risk when commitment is limited?
• Non-commitment and savings in dynamic risk-sharing contracts
• Efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage
• Risk Sharing and Information in Village Economies
• Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• Relational contracts: public versus private savings
• Efficient risk sharing and separation
• Untying the knot: how child support and alimony affect couples' dynamic decisions and welfare

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