Does risk sharing increase with risk aversion and risk when commitment is limited?

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2014.06.013zbMATH Open1402.91204OpenAlexW2145120306MaRDI QIDQ1994632FDOQ1994632

Authors: Sarolta Laczó 

Publication date: 1 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/809820/1/RiskinessJEDC.pdf

Recommendations

• Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment
• Efficient risk sharing with limited commitment and storage
• Non-commitment and savings in dynamic risk-sharing contracts
• Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment
• Equilibrium in risk-sharing games

zbMATH Keywords

limited commitmentrisk sharingcomparative staticsdynamic contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cites Work

• Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default
• The economics of risk and time
• Choosing Between Risky Prospects: The Characterization of Comparative Statics Results, and Location Independent Risk
• Some Stronger Measures of Risk Aversion in the Small and the Large with Applications
• Risk Vulnerability and the Tempering Effect of Background Risk
• Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market
• Risk Aversion and the Choice Between Risky Prospects: The Preservation of Comparative Statics Results
• Does Income Inequality Lead to Consumption Inequality? Evidence and Theory1
• Strong Increases in Risk and Their Comparative Statics
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
• Public versus private risk sharing
• Crowding out and crowding in: when does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?
• Household Intertemporal Behaviour: A Collective Characterization and a Test of Commitment

Cited In (5)

• Efficient risk sharing and separation
• Trust in risk sharing: a double-edged sword
• Efficient risk sharing with limited commitment and storage
• Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment
• Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment

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