Does risk sharing increase with risk aversion and risk when commitment is limited?
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Publication:1994632
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Cites work
- Choosing Between Risky Prospects: The Characterization of Comparative Statics Results, and Location Independent Risk
- Crowding out and crowding in: when does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?
- Does Income Inequality Lead to Consumption Inequality? Evidence and Theory1
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- Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market
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- Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
- Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
- International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- Public versus private risk sharing
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- Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
- Risk Vulnerability and the Tempering Effect of Background Risk
- Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
- Some Stronger Measures of Risk Aversion in the Small and the Large with Applications
- Strong Increases in Risk and Their Comparative Statics
- The economics of risk and time
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