Crowding out and crowding in: when does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.03.017zbMATH Open1246.91058OpenAlexW2033063561MaRDI QIDQ548246FDOQ548246

Tobias Broer

Publication date: 28 June 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.017

zbMATH Keywords

defaultredistributioninsurancefiscal policylimited enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Financial applications of other theories (91G80)

Cites Work

• Debt Constrained Asset Markets
• Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default
• Endogenous trading constraints with incomplete asset markets
• Does Income Inequality Lead to Consumption Inequality? Evidence and Theory1
• Public versus private risk sharing

Cited In (4)

• Does risk sharing increase with risk aversion and risk when commitment is limited?
• Introduction to incompleteness and uncertainty in economics
• The crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing: an experimental study
• Public versus private provision of liquidity: is there a trade-off?

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• The crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing: an experimental study 👍 👎
• The effects of redistributive taxation in credit markets with adverse selection 👍 👎
• Risk sharing with private and public information 👍 👎

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