Crowding out and crowding in: when does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.03.017MaRDI QIDQ548246zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tobias Broer

Publication date 28 June 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.017

zbMATH Keywords

defaultfiscal policyinsurancelimited enforcementredistribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Financial applications of other theories (91G80)

Recommendations

• Public versus private risk sharing
• Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Model with Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Income Risk
• The crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing: an experimental study
• The effects of redistributive taxation in credit markets with adverse selection
• Risk sharing with private and public information

Cites work

• Debt Constrained Asset Markets
• Does Income Inequality Lead to Consumption Inequality? Evidence and Theory1
• Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default
• Endogenous trading constraints with incomplete asset markets
• Public versus private risk sharing

Cited in

(6)

• Public versus private provision of liquidity: is there a trade-off?
• Does risk sharing increase with risk aversion and risk when commitment is limited?
• The crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing: an experimental study
• Redistribution and fiscal uncertainty shocks
• Introduction to incompleteness and uncertainty in economics
• Public versus private risk sharing

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