The crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing: an experimental study

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.004MaRDI QIDQ2016231zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wanchuan Lin, Juanjuan Meng, Yi-Ming Liu

Publication date 19 June 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

altruisminsurancecrowding-out effectinformal risk sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Public versus private risk sharing
• Crowding out and crowding in: when does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?
• Informal insurance networks
• Migration and informal insurance: evidence from a randomized controlled trial and a structural model
• Inequality and risk management: evidence from a lab experiment in Ghana

Cites work

• Crowding out and crowding in: when does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?
• Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences
• Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
• Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
• Public versus private risk sharing
• Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts

Cited in

(5)

• Crowding out and crowding in: when does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?
• Inequality and risk management: evidence from a lab experiment in Ghana
• Causal Inference With Interference and Noncompliance in Two-Stage Randomized Experiments
• Migration and informal insurance: evidence from a randomized controlled trial and a structural model
• God insures those who pay? Formal insurance and religious offerings in Ghana

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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