The crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing: an experimental study
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Publication:2016231
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.004zbMATH Open1293.91098OpenAlexW3122930898MaRDI QIDQ2016231FDOQ2016231
Yi-Ming Liu, Juanjuan Meng, Wanchuan Lin
Publication date: 19 June 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.004
Cites Work
- Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
- Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
- Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences
- Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
- Public versus private risk sharing
- Crowding out and crowding in: when does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?
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