Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1763203
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00255-2zbMath1080.91024MaRDI QIDQ1763203
Fabrizio Perri, Patrick J. Kehoe
Publication date: 22 February 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Incomplete markets; Default; Risk-sharing; Decentralization; Enforcement constraints; Sovereign debt; Sustainable equilibrium
91B64: Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation)
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A25: Dynamic games
Related Items
Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment, Endogenous trading constraints with incomplete asset markets
Cites Work
- WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
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