Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00255-2zbMath1080.91024MaRDI QIDQ1763203

Patrick J. Kehoe, Fabrizio Perri

Publication date: 22 February 2005

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Incomplete marketsDefaultRisk-sharingDecentralizationEnforcement constraintsSovereign debtSustainable equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (3)

EMU, EU, market integration and consumption smoothing ⋮ Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment ⋮ Endogenous trading constraints with incomplete asset markets

Cites Work

• WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Sustainable Plans and Mutual Default
• Debt Constrained Asset Markets
• Liquidity Constrained Markets Versus Debt Constrained Markets
• Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
• Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default
• International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets
• The Welfare Adjustment Process: Its Stability Properties
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment

This page was built for publication: Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement