Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.10.003MaRDI QIDQ1622464zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Rosario Macera

Publication date 19 November 2018

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic moral hazardloss aversionexpectation-based reference-dependent preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Utility theory (91B16)

Recommendations

• Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4091139 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

(8)

• English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders
• Learning and Intertemporal Incentives
• Task assignment under agent loss aversion
• Optimal incentive contracts under loss aversion and inequity aversion
• Intertemporal benefit functions
• Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion
• Intertemporal incentive allocation in simple hierarchies
• Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders

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