Task assignment under agent loss aversion

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.06.040MaRDI QIDQ2446473zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kohei Daido, Kimiyuki Morita, Takeshi Murooka, Hiromasa Ogawa

Publication date 17 April 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.06.040

zbMATH Keywords

loss aversionreference-dependent preferencesstate-independent assignmenttask assignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A model of reference-dependent preferences
• Fairness and desert in tournaments
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Task assignment under agent loss aversion

Cited in

(8)

• Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion
• The effects of loss aversion on deceptive advertising policies
• Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction
• Supervisory information and loss aversion
• Optimal incentive contracts under loss aversion and inequity aversion
• Task assignment under agent loss aversion
• On the study of a single-period principal-agent model with taxation
• Asymmetric optimal auction design with loss-averse bidders

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