On the study of a single-period principal-agent model with taxation

DOI10.1155/2020/5401591MaRDI QIDQ6534544zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Huan Wang, Wenyi Huang

Publication date 7 May 2021

Published in Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Risk aversion, moral hazard and the principal's loss.
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Cites work

• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Venture capital contracting with double-sided moral hazard and fairness concerns

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