On the study of a single-period principal-agent model with taxation

DOI10.1155/2020/5401591zbMATH Open1547.91016MaRDI QIDQ6534544FDOQ6534544

Authors: Huan Wang, Wenyi Huang 

Publication date: 7 May 2021

Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model
• Venture capital contracting with double-sided moral hazard and fairness concerns

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