Task assignment under agent loss aversion

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.06.040zbMATH Open1284.91479OpenAlexW1981596616MaRDI QIDQ2446473FDOQ2446473

Authors: Kohei Daido, Kimiyuki Morita, Takeshi Murooka, Hiromasa Ogawa 

Publication date: 17 April 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.06.040

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zbMATH Keywords

loss aversiontask assignmentreference-dependent preferencesstate-independent assignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

Cites Work

• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• A model of reference-dependent preferences
• Fairness and desert in tournaments
• Task assignment under agent loss aversion

Cited In (6)

• Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction
• Task assignment under agent loss aversion
• Supervisory information and loss aversion
• Optimal incentive contracts under loss aversion and inequity aversion
• The effects of loss aversion on deceptive advertising policies
• Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion

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